Open-source corridor monitoring
Two of the world's busiest shipping lanes run through this region: the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf. Both are under attack. This page tracks what that has done to merchant traffic, using published figures only, each one traceable to a named source. Figures that fail validation are named and withheld rather than smoothed.
The short version. Ships are still avoiding the Red Sea. Traffic through the Suez Canal runs about 41% below its 2023 level, and the vessels that would have taken that route are sailing around the southern tip of Africa instead. The two lines below crossed in early 2024 and have not converged since.
Average merchant transits per day, by month · IMF PortWatch, Daily Chokepoints Data
Before late 2023 about 1.5 ships used Suez for every one rounding Africa. Today it is the other way round, and by a wider margin: 1.9 round the Cape for every one through Suez. Shipping did not stop. It moved.
| Month | Through the Red Sea | Around Africa |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 2023 | 71 | 42.3 |
| Feb 2023 | 70.1 | 42 |
| Mar 2023 | 71.8 | 43.2 |
| Apr 2023 | 77.3 | 45.1 |
| May 2023 | 77.4 | 49.2 |
| Jun 2023 | 75.3 | 51.6 |
| Jul 2023 | 71.4 | 52.3 |
| Aug 2023 | 71.5 | 56.5 |
| Sep 2023 | 74.2 | 55.8 |
| Oct 2023 | 76.2 | 50.4 |
| Nov 2023 | 76.6 | 49.3 |
| Dec 2023 | 71.4 | 51.4 |
| Jan 2024 | 48 | 72.2 |
| Feb 2024 | 42.4 | 85.8 |
| Mar 2024 | 38.9 | 85.9 |
| Apr 2024 | 40.9 | 87.7 |
| May 2024 | 40.7 | 91.6 |
| Jun 2024 | 39 | 95.5 |
| Jul 2024 | 38.5 | 91.7 |
| Aug 2024 | 40.3 | 93.7 |
| Sep 2024 | 37.4 | 86.5 |
| Oct 2024 | 37.5 | 89 |
| Nov 2024 | 36 | 83.7 |
| Dec 2024 | 35.7 | 81 |
| Jan 2025 | 37.1 | 84.4 |
| Feb 2025 | 34.1 | 87.9 |
| Mar 2025 | 37.3 | 80.7 |
| Apr 2025 | 37 | 84.1 |
| May 2025 | 37 | 89.4 |
| Jun 2025 | 36.7 | 91.9 |
| Jul 2025 | 38 | 96.4 |
| Aug 2025 | 38.6 | 98.1 |
| Sep 2025 | 42.1 | 94.4 |
| Oct 2025 | 41.3 | 94.1 |
| Nov 2025 | 42.9 | 87.2 |
| Dec 2025 | 40.1 | 84.7 |
| Jan 2026 | 39.1 | 87.7 |
| Feb 2026 | 41.4 | 87 |
| Mar 2026 | 41 | 91.3 |
| Apr 2026 | 42.1 | 92.8 |
| May 2026 | 39.1 | 96.9 |
| Jun 2026 | 40.4 | 92.8 |
| Jul 2026 | 41.9 | 91.5 |
| Aug 2026 | 41 | 90.3 |
| Sep 2026 | 40.4 | 86.1 |
| Oct 2026 | 43.1 | 87.8 |
Each panel is on its own scale, Jan 2023 to Oct 2026. Hormuz shows only what public vessel tracking can see, which is a fraction of the real traffic — see below.
Why the traffic moved · schematic, not to scale
The northern route is the short one, and it passes five places where it can be interdicted. The southern route is roughly twice as long and passes none, which is the entire reason for taking it. Shipping moved from the first to the second in a matter of weeks and has stayed there for nearly three years.
Traffic remains approximately 65% below pre-conflict levels.
Transits measured against the level prior to 22 Jul 2026. Steepened through late August, then settled.
Average transits per day by vessel type · 2023, before the attacks against the last 90 days
Voluntary Reporting Area · Arabian Gulf through the wider Indian Ocean
| Indicator | 16 Oct | 23 Oct | 30 Oct | 6 Nov | 13 Nov | 20 Nov | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Warnings issued | 145 | 151 | 153 | 166 | 173 | 181 | +36 |
| Iran-US conflict related | 135 | 141 | 145 | 155 | 163 | 170 | +35 |
| Damage to vessels reported | 114 | 119 | 122 | 133 | 141 | 148 | +34 |
| Injury or fatalities | 76 | 77 | 77 | 82 | 86 | 90 | +14 |
| Advisories issued | 20 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 23 | +3 |
| Near-miss reports | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 0 |
EUNAVFOR Aspides, cumulative since February 2024
Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, FY2025
47 member nations across 5 task forces and roughly 3.2 million square miles
Established 17 April 2022. Command has changed hands 5 times.
Each value traces to a named primary source and publication date. Nothing here is modelled, smoothed or estimated.
| Figure | Source | As of | Validation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chokepoint traffic change | UKMTO VRA Overview, Reports No. 11, No. 12, No. 13, No. 14, No. 15, No. 16 | 2026-11-20 | Cross-checked across reports |
| Six event indicators | UKMTO VRA Overview, Reports No. 11, No. 12, No. 13, No. 14, No. 15, No. 16 | 2026-11-20 | Cross-checked across reports |
| Days since escalation | UKMTO VRA Overview, Report No. 16 | 2026-11-20 | Published figure, not computed |
| Protection totals | EUNAVFOR Aspides | Aug 2026 | Single source |
| Freedom of navigation | Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, FY2025 | FY ending 30 Sep 2025 | Single source, annual |
| Coalition structure | Combined Maritime Forces | Sep 2026 | Single source |
| Transits per day by route | IMF PortWatch, Daily Chokepoints Data | 2026-11-15 | Independent of UKMTO; AIS-derived |
| Hormuz AIS visibility | IMF PortWatch, Daily Chokepoints Data and UKMTO VRA Overview | 2026-11-15 | Two sources, deliberately not reconciled |
Red Sea attacks on shipping — exchanges values with piracy incidents between the 25 Sep and 2 Oct reportsPiracy related incidents — exchanges values with Red Sea attacks between the 25 Sep and 2 Oct reportsConfirmed total losses — duplicates the Iran-US conflict figure in the 2 Oct reportTotal events reported — duplicates the days-since-escalation figure in the 2 Oct reportAbsolute Hormuz transit counts — cumulative series decreases across reports, which is not possibleRaw data: corridor.json · Reuse permitted with attribution to the primary sources named above.